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ABSTRACT
Democratic regression has become a worrying phenomenon in the last years. Social
science has provided a variety of explanations why democratic regimes have lost
democratic regime quality. Against this backdrop, I take stock of the recent
literature by putting forward two important analytical distinctions that we should
make more explicit. First, I propose to classify our current explanations along the
source where the cause for the malaise originated. By doing so, I introduce a
distinction between erosion and decay type of arguments. While the former is a
gradual process that is caused exogenously – like wind or water hitting a stone –
the latter is caused endogenously – like the half-life in nuclear decay processes.
Second, I draw a distinction between the endogenous or exogenous roots of the
cause and the subsequent causal mechanism that connects the cause with the
outcome. I outline the need for dissecting a causal mechanism into its constitutive
components and highlight its underlying dimensions of temporality. Throughout
the article, I use empirical case material as well as relevant secondary literature to
illustrate these points.
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Many countries around the globe suffer currently from democratic regression, broadly
defined as a loss of democratic quality.1 These developments can be observed in a
variety of places and dominate today’s headlines. Among many examples, Hungary
and Poland’s democratic quality has deteriorated as well as in Erdoğan’s Turkey,
Russia under Putin, Duterte in the Philippines, or the United States of America
under Trump.
Democratic regression is normatively worrying and empirical widespread, so that it
does not surprise that the finest minds of comparative democratization have lately
turned their eyes to these developments and have begun to dig deeper for theoretically
saturated explanations.2 Yet, with notable exceptions,3 the current state of the art is –
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to my reading – densely populated with in-depth case studies that seek to explain
rather the particular, but that lack theoretical and conceptual coherence. This article
is motivated by reviewing these insightful accounts and classifying them in a novel
and hopefully helpful fashion that seeks to facilitate dialogue across individual cases.
As such, the article can be understood as a taking stock endeavour with a constructive
intent.
To be clear, there is an abundance of explanatory factors that are currently dis-
cussed. These factors are usually combined into bigger clusters, often ordered along
the basic social science distinction between economic, societal, cultural, and political
factors,4 or, alternatively, between supply-side and demand-side explanations.5 A
more fine-grained distinction is made by Waldner and Lust.6 They use the classic
democratization theories that have been advanced in the last decades and turn them
on their head for explaining the reverse trend of autocratization. In this light, they dis-
tinguish between agency-based theories, political culture approaches, institutionalist
theories, theories of political economy, social structures and coalitional arguments,
and international factors. Tying different explanatory factors to the wealth of democra-
tization studies is intuitive, but represents, of course, only an approximation that,
above all, needs to assume a symmetrical argumentation: When X has led to democra-
tization, the absence of X must lead to autocratization. Remarkably, the editors of this
special issue suggest to further distinguish between proximate and deep causes of
democratic regressions,7 harking back to Mayr’s8 influential distinction on the
nature of causation in biology.
In this article, I take a different stance. I suggest that the basic distinction should be
made between endogenous and exogenous factors,9 proposing that the source of the
cause could constitute a helpful axis along which we could classify arguments about
democratic regression. This contribution explicitly adopts a historical institutionalist
perspective and argues that the institutionalist repertoire of explaining change is a
well-suited starting point for sorting our current explanations of democratic
regression. More specifically, I use the approach by Thelen and colleagues10 on
gradual institutional change as a theoretical springboard to distinguish between two
forms of gradual change. Borrowing metaphors from natural science, I draw a distinc-
tion between erosion and decay processes. While decay is endogenously caused,
erosion is an exogenously driven process. I argue that it is of utmost importance to
clarify in the first place where the causal driver for democratic regression is actually
located. This is the major axis along which I classify the causes of democratic
regression. This distinction has important implications not only for adequately
explaining the empirical phenomenon of democratic regression, but also for sound
policy advice.
The distinction between erosion or decay arguments has also important repercus-
sions on the design of the causal mechanism that translates the causes to the outcome.
As such, the causal mechanism is either being rooted in an endogenous or exogenous
cause. In other words, the causes constitute the anchor points from which one needs to
further develop the inner logic and unfolding of the concrete causal mechanisms. I
outline the need for dissecting a causal mechanism into its components and highlight
underlying dimensions of temporality. As such, I pay emphasis on marking a differ-
ence between the cause X and the causal mechanism M, arguing that they should be
kept separate for analytical precision.
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The same argument about analytical precision applies for an obvious concern. A
complex phenomenon like democratic regression is not mono-causal. There is not
only one cause that triggers one causal mechanism that leads to the outcome of demo-
cratic regression. Rather, it is a conjunction of several streams and mechanisms that
might partially overlap temporally and substantially, that affect each other, be it in a
mutually reinforcing or mutually undermining way. Yet, I think it is safe to argue
that acknowledging the complex interplay of these mechanisms does not prevent us
from disentangling them from each other. In contrast, analytical precision demands
to dissect them form each other. As such, I see the proposed distinction between (a)
endogenous and exogenous causes and (b) causes and causal mechanisms as important
steps in taking apart complex explanations.
The article is structured as follows. In section II, I will go back to the historical neo-
institutionalist debate about explaining institutional change. I attempt to bring their
toolbox back into the debate, enriching our understanding of democratic regression.
Based on this discussion, I propose in section III a new axis along which we should clas-
sify our arguments. Depending on the source where the causes for the malaise originates,
I distinguish between exogenous erosion and endogenous decay arguments. In section
IV, I then zoom into the causal mechanisms M. I conclude in section V by first synthe-
sizing major insights of this article and then highlighting future research avenues.
The historical institutionalist toolkit: forms of gradual change
In this article, I draw on the rich toolkit of historical neo-institutionalism.11 Historical
institutionalism provides not only an ample, but also a well-sorted arsenal in explain-
ing change. Against this backdrop, I argue that it can be made fruitful for systemati-
cally thinking about processes of democratic regressions.
Yet, it should be noted that historical neo-institutionalism has long been plagued by
a stability bias.12 Using its typical instrumentarium, it is easier for historical institu-
tionalists to explain the long phases of institutional reproduction than to actually
account for changes. The “punctuated equilibrium”, the dualism of path dependency
and critical juncture, is almost essential knowledge for this theoretical approach.13
In most accounts, long phases of institutional stability that are often portrayed as
being based on increasing returns to scale14 are interrupted by brief moments of
change in which decisive action is taken in either direction.15 The Achilles heel of
this explanatory dualism, however, has always been how the brief interruptions that
enable change come about in the first place. This task was often relegated to the
mere occurrence of critical junctures.
Against this backdrop, it is particularly the research agenda of Kathleen Thelen and
colleagues who challenged this approach.16 She deviates from the “common wisdom”
of historical institutionalism in two important regards. First, she is more interested in
explaining how change comes about – rather than assuming that there are windows of
opportunities in which “permissive” and “productive conditions” make change
likely.17 Second, she is more interested in gradual forms of change.18 While the “punc-
tuated equilibrium” approach focuses on a sudden interruption, the Thelen agenda
adopts a longer time horizon. The duration as the temporal length of a process in
which change takes place is extended. Framing it differently: while the longue durée
that is characteristic for many works in the historical institutionalism tradition
refers often to the development of the outcome after the critical juncture is taken,
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this approach uses extended and stretched periods of time in order to explain how the
outcome came actually about over time.
I think it is fair to argue that the Thelen research agenda could be divided into two
broad parts.19 Particularly in her work with Streeck, Thelen accounts for different
forms of change.20 In her work with Mahoney, she further develops the idea by
adding types of “change agents” that stand behind these forms of change.21 Five
forms of gradual change have been identified by Thelen and her co-authors:
displacement, layering, drift, conversion, and exhaustion. Displacement sees the
gradual emergence of new models that call into question old ones; layering is the
“active sponsorship of amendments, additions, or revisions to an existing set of insti-
tutions”; drift is the slippage of an institution; conversion is the redeployment of an old
institution to a new purpose; and exhaustion refers to the overextension and gradual
breakdown of an institution.22 These five types aptly capture the broad variety of
gradual change processes. Yet, these five processes are rather descriptive and pro-
cedural in nature and answer the question of how change unfolds, but not why these
processes take place.
The respective actors behind (four of) these five processes are specified in a later
work.23 Layering processes are driven by subversive actors. The most conducive
environment for the emergence of these actors is a weak institution with low discre-
tionary leeway for the actors, but one in which the political context has strong veto
powers. Displacement sees insurrectionaries as major actors that act also in weak insti-
tutions with a lot of discretionary leeway, but with rather weak outside veto points.
Drift is driven by parasitic symbionts that act under a tight institution with low
leeway and in a strong context with veto power. Lastly, Thelen and Mahoney
assume opportunistic actors in a tight institution, but with a weak veto environment.
Endogenous or exogenous causes for democratic regression?
I take these insightful considerations of historical neo-institutionalism as a theoretical
starting point. The different forms and actors of gradual processes that recent research
has addressed give answers to the questions of how change takes place, by whom
change is performed, and under what circumstances these developments are to be
expected. I add to this insightful discussion the source of the cause, distinguishing
between exogenous and endogenous causes.
Erosion and decay arguments
While the above discussed literature is usually interpreted as forms of endogenous
gradual change, the distinction between endogenous and exogenous causes can
already be read into it.24 Layering, for example, is better to be understood if the
change comes from without and is added onto an old institution. Similarly, exhaustion
invokes an understanding of endogenous decay. When it comes to displacement, drift,
and conversion, the picture becomes more complicated. Expressis verbis, Streeck and
Thelen remain ambivalent about exogenous and endogenous drivers for these types
of change. Displacement, for example, can happen either due to a “rediscovery or acti-
vation of previously suppressed or suspended possibilities” or due to an “invasion” that
is characterized by a “supplanting of indigenous institutions and practices with foreign
ones”.25 The former would be an example for endogenous gradual change, the latter for
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an exogenous one. In my language, the former is an endogenous decay that needs to be
analytically separated from exogenous erosion.
Literally, endogenous and exogenous to an institution means that the cause for a
process is not only located within or outside the institution under study, but that
the cause is also generated within or outside an institution. This driver for change
works so from the outside in – or vice versa. I suggest distinguishing between internally
generated causes and externally generated causes, the former associated with forms of
decay, the latter associated with forms of erosion. Borrowing from natural sciences, I
argue that erosion-type arguments use a different explanatory architecture than decay-
type arguments. While erosion is a phenomenon in which wind or water hits a stone,
making it porous over time and carrying gradually away its substance, decay is a
phenomenon in which the seeds of its own destruction are already implanted in the
radioactive chemical element itself. Compared to stable chemical elements, radioactive
elements are inherently instable and the varying number of neutrons per nucleus
determine the length of the respective half-lives. What is important to note here is
that radioactive decay is an internally driven disintegration process, while erosion is
set in motion by outside forces.26
Needless to say, in the institutionalist literature, there is an abundance of definitions
of what an institution actually is. These definitions range from very narrow and often
formalized understandings to broader conceptions that include informal arrangements
as well.27 Douglass North has proposed one of the most widespread and comprehen-
sive definitions when he famously argued that institutions are “the rules of the game”
and the “humanly devised constraints that shape human behavior”.28 This definition is
elastic enough to subsume various strands of institutionalist thinking.29 For the study
of democratic regressions, democratic regimes are usually perceived as a set of inter-
twined sub-institutions that range from formal institutions like party, electoral or rep-
resentation systems, to informal ones that are usually unwritten and include diverse
institutions like societal norms of for example fairness, forbearance, how to treat the
political opposition, to shared behavioural equilibria, and business-government regu-
lations. It is therefore the first and foremost analytical task of scholars to clearly define
the borders of the institution or institutional ensemble that they actually study. Based
on this decision, the core question in identifying endogenous decay processes is then to
what extent the (interplay of sub-) institutions directly generate (unintended and often
perverse) incentives, produce inner tensions, or only indirectly enable actions by
leaving open regulatory loopholes and not closing gaps that actors can then exploit
for subverting this very institution.30 In contrast, democratic institutions can be
washed out by outside forces, marking the opposite pole of erosion processes.
Erosion and decay arguments for democratic regression
This distinction between erosion and decay becomes important when ordering current
accounts of democratic regression. I set forth that this major dividing line helps struc-
turing our explanations for the empirical phenomenon of democratic regression.
Unfortunately, social science has already adopted a metaphorical language that does
not pay sufficient attention to the analytical difference.31 For example, the excellent
conceptual discussion by Tom Gerald Daly insightfully condenses the current state
of the art, but defines decay – like others did for erosion – as the “incremental degra-
dation of the structures and substance of liberal constitutional democracy”, paying less
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attention to the source of the malaise.32 At the end of the article, Daly even highlights
two prominent research projects, a multi-university consortium “Democratic Erosion”
and the “Democratic Decay (Dem-Dec)” project,33 that are both equally committed to
studying democratic regression processes. While these projects share the gradual
unfolding of these processes, they do not focus on the question of endogenous or
exogenous causation.
Yet, it seems that the erosion metaphor is currently prevailing. In her insightful
article, Bermeo34 states for example that “troubled democracies today are more
likely to erode rather than to shatter”. Ginsburg35 discusses what needs to be done
for an “anti-erosion jurisprudence”, while Lieberman and colleagues36 see an
“erosion of democratic norms” in the United States. Diamond37 describes the “signifi-
cant erosion in electoral fairness, political pluralism, and civic space for opposition and
dissent” in Turkey, and the V-Dem scholars38 describe recent “democratic erosion
processes” in, among others, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, the United
States, India, Bulgaria, and Brazil.
Despite the frequent usage of the word, real erosion arguments are rather rare in
explaining democratic regression.39 It might not be too far-fetched to say that its ter-
minological usage is inversely related to actual erosion arguments. One example for
exogenous causation is the modification of the idea of “linkage” and “leverage”, orig-
inally put forward by Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way.40 In an attempt to “turn the
tables”, the argument runs as follows: the more democratic regimes are linked to auto-
cratic ones, via economic trade, but also communication channels, visits, and cultural
affinities of any sort, the stronger the leverage of the autocratic regime to influence and
autocratize the democratic regime. While Levitsky and Way have provided ample
empirical evidence for the democratization perspective, the autocratization perspective
still needs to be tested. As of now, there is no systematic empirical evidence that linkage
and leverage actually work also in the other direction. But, beyond doubt, the linkage-
leverage-thesis is one that represents the most clear-cut erosion-type of explanation.
The autocratic regime is like wind or water the outside force attacking the democratic
substance. In Thelen and Streeck’s descriptive terms, democratic institutions can be so
displaced, converted, or be layered by active foreign sponsorship. Of course, Russia and
China are discussed in this context as the most prominent of these foreign sponsors41
or “gravity centers”.42 Yet, what is important to note here is that in all these processes,
the cause is exogenous to the democratic institution that is targeted, marking so a
clear-cut erosion process.
While the linkage-leverage hypothesis demands strategic action, this can be relaxed
for a related argument. Value-based diffusion can be unintentional.43 Yet, in parallel to
the above, the diffusion of democratic norms is much more researched than the other
way around.44 The current state of the art is still rather cautious about the effect of
autocratic diffusion.45 Future research needs to fill this research lacuna and clarify
to what extent an inherent attractiveness of authoritarian values, often catchily
coined as the Chinese or Singaporean model,46 an unintentional diffusion of author-
itarian practices, or even the explicit learning from other’s authoritarian example47
explains a deterioration of democratic quality.
Please note that erosion arguments are exogenous arguments, which should not be
equated with international arguments. While the linkage-leverage and the diffusion lit-
erature focus in their work on international factors, the exogenous force for erosion
does not necessarily need to come from the international arena. It can also be bred
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domestically. The major dividing line is as to whether the cause is generated within or
outside the democratic institutions that one studies. To name just a few instances of
domestic erosion, an anti-democratic influence of the national military forces, an
overly conservative Catholic Church, strong national Islamist traditions, or deep
ethno-political cleavages can also constitute domestic exogenous causes.
If taking a historical perspective, exogeneity can also stem from a different angle. If
for example the timing, a certain “populist Zeitgeist”,48 is taken for explanatory pur-
poses and not only as a descriptor of an era in which we live in, it constitutes also
rather an exogenous than an endogenous factor for explaining democratic regression.
Yet, more empirical research is needed here as well that demonstrates how timing actu-
ally develops causal power within domestic democratic regression processes, let alone
how contagious it is across countries.49 Moreover, if we adopt an explanatory perspec-
tive in which we treat the past as exogenous to our institutions under study, then
today’s democratic regressions can be explained by previous low-quality democratiza-
tions. These democratizations suffered particularly from economic and social inequal-
ity and weak political structures, providing already a fertile ground for democratic
regressions. Adopting such a perspective means to treat this history as an exogenous
cause for today’s situation.50 The causes for today’s deterioration of democratic
quality are here generated outside (i.e. temporally prior to) the (current) institutions
under study.51 Take for example the case of the Philippines. It is argued here that
the former military dictator Ferdinand Marcos established a system of patronage, cor-
ruption, cronyism and wide-spread pork-barrel politics in which political institutions
were destroyed or severely weakened.52 This authoritarian shadow that is still tangible
until today continues to erode current democratic substance, both in terms of political
culture and government institutions. Hutchcroft and Rocamora53 aptly summarize
that in the post-Marcos era “the logic of patronage remains central to understanding
Philippine politics, and political parties remain weak, ill-defined, and poorly
institutionalized”.
In turn, rivalling arguments are of endogenous nature. Democratic regression
happens often within democratic core institutions that have been initially built to guar-
antee horizontal and vertical accountability. The arguably most influential work today
on this topic, the book on “How Democracies Die” by Steven Levitsky and Daniel
Ziblatt,54 uses the classic and seminal work by Juan Linz55 which can also be read
more in terms of endogenous than exogenous causation. Linz suggested a list of
four key indicators. First, Linz spoke about a weak commitment to the democratic
“rules of the game”, as evidenced in undermining the legitimacy of elections, taking
extraconstitutional means like military involvement in politics or violent insurrections.
A second warning signal refers to the denial of the legitimacy of the political opponent
and to what extent they are defamed as criminal, subversive, foreign agents or consti-
tuting a threat to national security. A third aspect is toleration or even an encourage-
ment of violence by actors close to the incumbent. A final dimension of authoritarian
behaviour in democratic politics is the willingness and readiness to restrict civil liber-
ties of political opponents, including press freedom, freedom of movement, and
freedom of association. These indicators by Linz can be used to identify countries
that are at high risk or that already entered democratic regression. What is important
to note here is that these causes are rather generated within than outside the demo-
cratic institutions.
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Another prominent argument of inner tensions within the institutional design of
democracies has lately been put forward by Dan Slater and Aries Arugay.56 They
argue – using Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Taiwan as empirical examples
– that democratic institutions demand vertical accountability and horizontal account-
ability at the same time, thereby following simultaneously the conflictive aim of
inclusion and constraint, causing internal institutional conflict that sparks institutional
polarization. In a similar vein, Milan Svolik57 compellingly demonstrates that the
causes for democratic regression “lies in a vulnerability that is inherent to democratic
politics.”He develops an argument in which authoritarian populists exploit a dilemma
that is ingrained into the democratic institution of elections. Elections provide voters
with two choices that can be conflictive, particularly in countries with deep political
cleavages and acute tensions: democratic principles on the one hand and partisan
interests, embodied by populist leaders, on the other hand. Using experimental
methods, Svolik58 shows for Turkey, Venezuela, and the United States that a significant
portion of the population “act as partisans first and democrats only second”, ranking
partisan interests higher than democratic principles. Like for the Slater and Arugay
study, the cause of democratic regression is seen by Svolik in endogenous tensions
rather than in exogenously driven processes.
The relevance of endogenous explanations of democratic regression are bolstered
by empirical evidence. Svolik59 argues that democratic subversions are either caused
by military coups or executive turnovers. In his account, between 1973 and 2018 88
of 197 cases of democratic declines have been caused by executive takeovers, while
only 46 cases can be attributed to military involvement into civilian politics. The
time trend is clear: Since 2005 four out of five democratic regressions are caused by
democratically elected incumbents that abuse their power. And one of their most
important tools for undermining democracy is – paradoxically – law and the liberal
democratic constitution.60 Kim Lane Scheppele61 captivatingly demonstrates in this
context how “legalistic autocrats” exploited the inherent tension between a (vulgarized
understanding of) democracy and constitutionalism to the detriment of liberal values.
To sum up, erosion arguments, if taken seriously, refer to a cause that is generated
outside the institution under study. Despite the high usage of the term, this type of
argument seems to be rather rare. Linkage-leverage-arguments arguments are proto-
typical for such an endeavour. In contrast, decay arguments about democratic
regression that focus on endogenous tensions within democratic designs seem to be
overall more widespread. This might be open to debate, but the distinction between
the locus of the cause should be made. The source of the malaise needs to be
located in the first place. This is not only for the sake of analytical clarity but might
have also important repercussions on advising political praxis.
Zooming into the causal mechanism of democratic regression
The locating of a cause has direct implications for detecting causal mechanisms. In an
admittedly very simplified version, an explanation of a phenomenon includes causes X,
a causal mechanism M, and an outcome Y (X → M → Y). In the previous section, I
have introduced the major distinction between endogenous and exogenous causes.
This section is dedicated to detailing the causal mechanism M. The set of causes X
and their inherent properties impact the working of the causal mechanism. Yet,
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while properties of the cause influence the mechanism, both should be kept separate
from each other for analytical purposes.
Let me first clarify my understanding of a causal mechanism. It goes almost without
saying that its meaning is hotly contested. In an insightful review article, John
Gerring62 lists at least nine different meanings of what a causal mechanism can be.
Similarly, James Mahoney63 lists 24 slightly varying definitions by 21 authors. If
there is any common ground between these differing meanings, then I would follow
Gerring’s suggestion and see it in a “pathway or process by which an effect is pro-
duced”.64 It seems to be intuitive that a mechanistic explanation focuses on what
happens between X and Y. In close analogy to physical mechanics, Hedström and Yli-
koski65 suggest therefore to think of the “cogs and wheels (…) through which the
outcome to be explained was brought about”. Taking this analogy further, the idea
of disentangling the complex processes of democratic regression is to dissect the bits
and pieces in order to see how they interrelate and work together. In analytical
terms, this is the task of a clockmaker who opens the clock case in order to see how
the cogs and wheels interact.
As a further general caveat in zooming into the study of causal mechanisms, their
generative and repeated nature need to be emphasized. Both attributes are highlighted
by Renate Mayntz.66 A causal mechanism should generate the outcome and not remain
as a mere concurrent epiphenomenon. While this seems to be less controversial for
democratic regression mechanisms, she pays emphasis that a mechanism invokes
notions of regularity and should not be limited to idiographic case-specific expla-
nations. For her, a causal mechanism should be, at least in principle, transportable
from one specific context to another. A causal mechanism should produce the same
outcome when specified initial circumstances are met. The recurrent nature of
regression mechanism needs to be empirically demonstrated. This condition might
meet more scepticism in the case-oriented literature, but nevertheless remains a
useful thought exercise for abstracting from the specific for the sake of the general.67
Components of a causal mechanism
I follow a substantive understanding of causal mechanisms as complex systems of
interlocking and interacting parts. In philosophy of science, a widely used definition
of causal mechanism proves to be helpful here. A causal mechanism consists of “enti-
ties and activities organized such that they are productive of regular change from start-
up to finish or termination of condition”.68 Activities are understood as the “producer
of change” while entities are “the things that engage in activities”.69 This dualistic
understanding and the explicit distinction between activities and entities is crucial
here.70 Moreover, the analytical sociological tradition would add that we also need
to look for actor-centered micro-foundations of the macro-relationship.71 When the-
orizing processes of democratic regression, explicitly clarifying between (micro-)enti-
ties and their related activities of a causal mechanism constitutes an important
empirical step.
As argued above, the properties of the cause X do impact the causal mechanism M
and the way it is studied. It is straightforward to argue that endogenous or exogenous
causation makes us look at different locales. It is like marking a cross on a map that tells
us where to dig deeper. When digging deeper into a decay process, the focus of our
search for entities and activities lies automatically within the institution under
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study. Take the example of the autocratic legalism argument that I mentioned above.72
It is endogenously anchored. When detailing the causal mechanism behind this argu-
ment, the place to look for lies in inherent institutional weaknesses and loopholes that
make it possible, sometimes even incentivize, formally democratically elected leaders
to non-use, ab-use, and/or mis-use existing, but dormant laws to the detriment of
liberal democracy. While in the legalism mechanism the “non-, ab- and mis-use” of
laws refers so to the concrete activities, the involved entities are the governments
that instrumentalize lower-level courts as well as supreme and constitutional courts
and reform them in such ways that like-minded judges are appointed, and that critical
voices are suppressed, seizing incrementally power over courts, undermining judicial
independence in the alleged name of the people, curtailing then the rights of the oppo-
sition, and violating subsequently civil liberties and political rights.
Consider the empirical example of South Korea under Lee Myung-bak and Park
Geun-hye.73 It illustrates the inner working of the “autocratic legalism” mechanism
that Scheppele74 and Corrales75 showed for Hungary and Venezuela, i.e. the gradual
conversion of existing laws for illiberal purposes. Stephen Haggard and Jong-Sung
You76 argue for example that the South Korean democratic regression lies in the con-
junction of several legal tactics by the government. In this context, they refer to the
abuse of criminal defamation laws, to abuse of election laws, and the abuse of the
National Security Law. Using the language of historical institutionalism, this line of
argument can be subsumed under endogenous displacement in which an insurrection-
ary type of change agents activates “previously suppressed or suspended possibili-
ties”,77 being enabled by a weak institutional context.78 Under the presidency of Lee,
it is shown that the number of indictments for defamation doubled, often involving
massive attacks on the freedom of expression.79 Also, electoral laws were bended,
ranging from illegal use of money and gifts to illegal propaganda, and violations of
neutrality orders.80 While the National Security Law that entails the prohibition of
so-called “anti-government organizations” has been in great decline during the
liberal governments between 1998 and 2007, it saw a sharp increase when Lee
entered office.81
The South Korean case shares many similarities with the Indonesian democratic
regression episode between 2007 and 2014, exhibiting the recurrent nature of the auto-
cratic legalismmechanism.Warburton and Aspinall82 speak aptly of an “illiberal drift”.
They argue that not only “draconian laws on defamation and blasphemy”83 have been
used in more instances, but that the Indonesian government also relied on the 2013
Law on Societal Organizations (“NGO Law”) that prohibit, sanction, and censor
non-governmental organizations critical of the state doctrine Pancasila. Also like the
South Korean example, the Indonesian democratic regression is explained by “electoral
narrowing”84 in which electoral laws have been used by the incumbents to raise the
hurdles for competition thresholds, nomination procedures, and financing and cam-
paigning, transforming Indonesian democracy “into a system of intra-incumbency
contestation that excluded other forces trying to penetrate it”.85 These policies can
be adequately subsumed under an endogenous causal mechanism of autocratic
legalism.
In contrast, when exogenous erosion processes are traced, scholars need to concen-
trate on external actors outside the institution under study. The research focus should
lie then on the strength of the external forces that work from the outside in. As such,
erosion arguments seem to be generally more uni-directional, depending largely on the
52 J. GERSCHEWSKI
magnitude and intensity of the outside force that gradually weakens democratic sub-
stance. In turn, decay arguments are characterized by internal dynamics that often
involve self-reinforcing feedback loops. As such, the source of the cause does not
only tell us where to search for entities and activities for spelling out the causal mech-
anism, but also give us hints to probable inner workings, highlighting already implicit
temporalities that should be made explicit.
Accounting for temporality in causal mechanisms
Beyond dissecting a causal mechanism into its components and demonstrating its
recurrent nature, temporality is a crucial, but often underrated feature of a causal
mechanism in general – and of democratic regression mechanisms in particular.86
While the dissecting into components of a causal mechanism is often at least implicitly
done, the temporality question remains underspecified in the current literature. Tem-
porality covers the tempo of a process, as well as its duration, acceleration, sequencing,
and timing. In her admirable article, Anna Grzymala-Busse87 not only clarified the
differences between these temporal dimensions, but also gave concrete advice on
how to operationalize them and how to methodically approach them.
In most empirical instances, democratic regression is a slow process (tempo) that
takes a long time to develop (duration). Usually, democratic regression is – already
in its name – a process in which democratic substance is gradually weakened or hol-
lowed out over a longer period of time. While we might agree that these parameters are
often shared, they come with considerable empirical complications. Duration covers
the temporal length of how long a process operates, necessitating so not only the
identification of a clear starting and end point, but also establishing what Grzymala-
Busse88 calls a “temporal baseline”. We do not only need to justify the boundaries
of an event or a process, but also how we temporally relate this process to other pro-
cesses. Do we argue in terms of objective time, measured for example in months or
years, or do we relate it to the length of previous episodes? Moreover, what counts
as democratic regression, given that this is a complex phenomenon consisting of
several temporally overlapping sub-phenomena? Also, how do we deal with phenom-
ena that slowly accumulate over time, remaining under the radar of both academia and
praxis, before they finally enter a threshold and become visible? How should we classify
these invisible processes?89
In the introduction to this special issue on democratic regression in Asia-Pacific,
Croissant and Haynes90 propose for example a 10% decline in V-Dem’s Electoral
Democracy Index and V-Dem’s Liberal Democracy Index to define a democratic
regression. The starting point of the episode is marked by such a drop and is inter-
rupted when either a stagnation is observed over four years or when a substantial
increase is observed. This means that Croissant and Haynes use an objective time
(years) and do not relate it to the length of previous episodes. Also, it should be
noted that the indices that Croissant and Haynes use are situated on a rather high
aggregation level in which profound changes have already manifested themselves in
the respective countries. This should not be misunderstood as a critique of their
approach, but rather as an attempt to make the implicit explicit.
Justifying decisions for delineating the respective regression episodes is not a trivial
task that gets even more complicated when we consider tempo. Tempo of democratic
regression can be defined as the amount of decline in democratic quality per time
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period (duration). While tempo (fast and slow) should not be conflated with duration
(short and long), it should also be kept separate from arguments about acceleration.
Acceleration is change of tempo per time unit, taking into account the nonlinear
nature of democratic regression processes. The (unexpected) increase in tempo
might not only bring about turbulence, but also fosters situational logics in which
the emergence of new actors or the sudden re-shuffling of power asymmetries in
actor constellations is catalysed.91 While it still needs to be systematically tested, a
hypothesis could be formulated: Democratic regressions that can be traced back to
exogenous erosion remain rather on a constant tempo as the exogenous effect often
remains invariant over time. In turn, decay processes are more inclined towards
internal dynamics and self-reinforcing feedback loops, suggesting acceleration
processes.
Finally, sequencing and timing are two further crucial aspects of causal mechan-
isms.92 To my reading, they remain underexplored, but should be on the future
research agenda on democratic regression as well. A sequence is nothing more than
an “ordered list of elements”.93 Yet, for crafting convincing causal sequencing argu-
ments about democratic regressions, it needs to be shown that it is the order of
events that actually matters. In other words, the burden of proof lies in empirically
demonstrating that a sequence of X1→ X2→ X3 leads to the outcome Y, but a sequence
of say X1 → X3 → X2 would not. It is the order of events that develops causal power. I
am not aware of empirical case studies that focus on this type of explanation. Yet, it
seems to be a promising route, particularly for an endogenous type of explanation.
In contrast to sequence arguments, timing does not refer to the relative ordering of
events within a sequence, but it is anchored in an exogenous context. For timing argu-
ments, it is the change of the context that matters. It is the temporal circumstances that
cause a process. Applied to democratic regressions, the Zeitgeist argument that I men-
tioned above illustrates this thinking.94 Yet, again, to my reading of the state of the art,
this is an underexplored topic that should be addressed more systematically. While we
might all agree that we recently observe a clustering of democratic regressions, it still
needs to be shown that the timing does have an independent causal impact on (or at
least serve as a catalyst or facilitator for) these phenomena, both being effective within
a country and contagious across countries.
To sum up, when zooming into M, the burden of empirical proof lies (a) in demon-
strating the generative and (in principle) recurrent nature of the causal mechanisms;
(b) in decomposing the causal mechanism into its entities and activities and potentially
accounting for micro-level foundations; and (c) in integrating previously underex-
plored aspects of temporality that range from duration, tempo, and acceleration to
issues of timing and sequencing.
Conclusion
This article is written in light of the current rise of democratic regression phenomena.
It seeks to classify existing approaches and explanations in a novel way, pledging on the
one hand for analytical clarity and synthesizing on the other hand their insights into a
“checklist” how we could methodologically approach democratic regressions. While I
maintain that democratic regression processes are not only multi-faceted, but also
multi-causal, I argue that we should even be more analytically precise and dissect
the complex phenomenon into its constitutive parts. Three points are central.
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First, I seek to establish a new axis along which we can classify existing accounts.
Using historical neo-institutionalism as a theoretical starting point, the crucial dimen-
sion is the source where the cause for democratic regression originates. I broadly dis-
tinguish between endogenous and exogenous explanations to organize and categorize
existing explanatory factors. To illustrate the different logics, I use the natural science
metaphors of endogenous decay and exogenous erosion.
Second, I illustrate these considerations with selected secondary literature and
empirical cases. As such, I argue that despite the frequent usage of the term
“erosion”, decay arguments are not only more widespread, but also more convincing.
Exogenous causes that are found in the literature employ often a reversed linkage-
leverage argument. In contrast, endogenous causes argue more with inherent insti-
tutional tensions, be it between conflictive goals of inclusion and constraint or
between democratic and partisan principles.
Third, I argue that it is key for analytical precision to not only distinguish the
sources of the cause X, but separate the cause X from the causal mechanism M. I do
not question that X and M are interconnected and that properties of X influence the
inner working of M. To the contrary, I argue that we should take advantage of this
interconnectedness as the source of the cause gives us an orientation where to dig
deeper. It is the marking on a map that shows us where to dig deeper. The study of
causal mechanism details the concrete pathway by which the cause leads to the
outcome, with its preeminent task lying in decomposing its constitutive components,
the involved activities and entities, and in accounting for varying temporalities.
While the current state of the art provides ample empirical material for dissecting
the mechanisms into its components, the temporal dimension seems to be still under-
explored. When systematically detailing the inner workings of a causal mechanism,
basal temporal dimensions of duration, tempo and acceleration, but also of timing
and sequencing should be made more explicit. They constitute a useful toolbox for
refining our causal mechanisms with which we seek to explain democratic regression.
Yet, as much as future research could pick up these currently neglected dimensions, it
needs to be seen to what extent the classifications that I propose here proves to be
helpful guidance in ordering a fuzzy field.
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